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IMAGINE THAT A PLANE CRASHES and that the pilot andthree passengers are tragically killed. An investigation reveals
a potential problem with the “gadget,” a component part of the
aircraft. Investigators find that the gadget, which is essential to
the operation of the aircraft, had a design defect that probably
caused the accident. The representatives of the estates of the
deceased passengers sue the aircraft manufacturer asserting sev-
eral causes of action, including strict liability based on an al-
leged design defect.1 Under these facts, the aircraft
manufacturer could be held strictly liable for the accident in vir-
tually every jurisdiction under a doctrine commonly known as
“assembler liability.” According to this doctrine, “a manufac-
turer/assembler who incorporates a defective component part
into [its] finished product and places the finished product into
the stream of commerce is liable in tort to one injured as a re-
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1 Although this hypothetical specifically discusses a design defect, manufactur-
ing-defect and failure-to-warn theories of strict liability are often pursued as well.
This article does not address the standards applicable to negligence-based theo-
ries of product liability, which are distinct from, and typically harder to prove
than, strict liability claims.
169
170 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [82
sult of a defect in the component part.”2 This principle of liabil-
ity applies notwithstanding the fact that the assembler did not
design or manufacture the component part.3
But just how far does this liability extend? Imagine that the
gadget was not the same gadget installed when the original man-
ufacturer assembled and sold the aircraft, but rather an
aftermarket replacement part. Under Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration (FAA) regulations, third parties can manufacture and
sell replacement parts under a process known as parts manufac-
turer approval (PMA), which requires the third-party manufac-
turer essentially to demonstrate equivalency between the
original and replacement parts.4 This article examines the rela-
tively uncharted issue of an original equipment manufacturer’s
(OEM) potential exposure to strict liability for a third-party sup-
plier’s defective PMA replacement part.5 Analogous issues have
arisen in other product liability contexts, with most courts
adopting a “bright-line” rule that the manufacturer of an assem-
bled product cannot be held strictly liable for a design defect in
a replacement component part that it did not manufacture, sell,
or otherwise distribute, even where that replacement part was
identical to the original.6 However, recent decisions from the
highest courts of Maryland, New York, and California have de-
parted from that bright-line rule in asbestos cases, allowing a
manufacturer to be held strictly liable for components it did not
design, manufacture, or sell.7 This emerging trend begs the
question of whether the bright-line rule should continue to ap-
ply to other products cases, and for the reasons discussed below,
this article concludes that it should apply to aviation cases.
Part II of this article provides an overview of the FAA regula-
tions governing the production of aircraft and component parts.
Part III discusses the judicial treatment of similar strict product
liability questions in non-aviation cases, with Part IV specifically
examining cases involving other heavily regulated products,
such as pharmaceuticals. Part V argues that the majority, bright-
2 Baughman v. Gen. Motors Corp., 627 F. Supp. 871, 873 (D.S.C. 1985), aff’d,
780 F.2d 1131 (4th Cir. 1986).
3 Id.
4 14 C.F.R. § 21.33 (2016).
5 To date, only one case has raised this issue, but no court has actually decided
it. See Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 876 F. Supp. 2d 479, 487 (M.D. Pa.
2012) (discussing whether an OEM can be considered a de facto manufacturer of
the replacement part).
6 See infra Part III.A.
7 See infra Part III.B.
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line rule that has emerged from such case law—namely, that as-
semblers are not strictly liable for defective components they did
not design, manufacture, or distribute—should apply to OEMs
in the aviation context as well. Part VI then discusses the emer-
gence and growing use of additive manufacturing (or 3-D print-
ing) in the aviation industry, explaining that, although the
technology may well have the potential to revolutionize the pro-
duction of aircraft component parts from a technical and cost
perspective, nothing about this new technology justifies a depar-
ture from the bright-line rule.
II. REGULATORY BACKGROUND
A. ORIGINAL EQUIPMENT
The FAA is charged with promoting flight safety by establish-
ing minimum standards for, inter alia, aircraft design and manu-
facturing.8 To this end, it has established a multi-step process for
certifying such design and production. Step one of the process
is obtaining a “type certificate,” in which aircraft, engine, and
propeller manufacturers must obtain approval from the FAA of
any new designs.9 This process requires the applicant to “make
all inspections and tests necessary to determine . . . [t]hat [com-
ponent] parts of the products conform to the drawings in the
type design.”10 Based on the engineering and testing data, the
FAA determines the airworthiness of the manufacturer’s de-
signs.11 If the design complies with federal regulations, the FAA
issues a type certificate.12 Once a manufacturer has a type certifi-
cate, it can obtain a production certificate allowing it to manu-
facture and sell the type-certificated product.13 Manufacture of
the aircraft and component parts must be in strict accordance
with the approved type-certificated design to ensure that the
FAA will issue an airworthiness certificate for the product.14 Un-
like many other industries, therefore, the manufacturer of an
aircraft and its component parts must obtain specific approval
from the FAA of the design and manufacturing process.
8 See 49 U.S.C. § 44701(a) (2012).
9 14 C.F.R. §§ 21.21(b), 21.33(b), 21.35 (2016).
10 Id. § 21.33(b)(3).
11 Id. §§ 21.21(b), 21.33(b).
12 49 U.S.C. § 44704(a) (2012); 14 C.F.R. § 21.21(b).
13 14 C.F.R. § 21.132.
14 Id. §§ 21.146, 21.183.
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B. PARTS MANUFACTURE APPROVAL
To avoid the monopolization of aircraft component parts, the
FAA permits third parties to produce and sell replacement parts
for a type-certificated product, provided that the third party
complies with the PMA process.15 Under the PMA process, ap-
plicants must provide to the FAA, among other things:
Test reports and computations necessary to show that the design
of the article [for which a PMA is sought] meets the airworthi-
ness requirements of this subchapter. The test reports and com-
putations must be applicable to the product on which the article
is to be installed, unless the applicant shows that the design of
the article is identical to the design of [an] article that is covered
under a type certificate. If the design of the article was obtained
by a licensing agreement, the applicant must provide evidence of
that agreement.16
This regulation provides two alternative means of obtaining a
PMA. Under the first option, an applicant may rely on the so-
called “test and computation” method of Section 21.303(a)(4),
which “requires the PMA manufacturer to extensively test both
the original and replacement parts to prove that they are
equivalent.”17 Applicants relying on this method generally “em-
ploy two strategies to show compliance with applicable airwor-
thiness requirements for eligible products: general analysis and
15 Id. § 21.303(a)(4).
16 Id.; see also Parts Manufacturer Approval Procedures, FAA Order No.
8110.42D, Table 1 (Mar. 21, 2014) (stating that an applicant’s obligation to ob-
tain a PMA is to “[s]how that the design meets the applicable airworthiness stan-
dards by either of the following two ways: (1) Show that the PMA article’s design
is identical to the design of an article that is covered under a type certificate
(TC), or (2) Use test and computation that shows the PMA article’s design meets
the airworthiness requirements that apply to the affected products”). This article
does not reach the issue of whether strict liability should be imposed on OEMs
for design defects in PMA parts manufactured under a licensing agreement. Li-
censing agreements are highly fact specific, posing unique challenges for the for-
mulation of a general rule, and arguments in favor of strict liability in this distinct
context have been successful where a licensing agreement vested exclusive design
and manufacturing oversight in the OEM despite the fact that the article was
manufactured under a PMA by a third-party manufacturer. See Sikkelee v. Preci-
sion Airmotive Corp., 876 F. Supp. 2d 479, 487 (M.D. Pa. 2012) (denying sum-
mary judgment in a strict liability claim where, under the licensing agreement
between the OEM and the PMA holder, the OEM “exclusively control[led] the
design and manufacture of [the] replacement component part[ ] and man-
date[d] the installation of said part[ ] during an overhaul of its engine”).
17 Rolls-Royce Corp. v. Heros, Inc., No. 3:07-CV-0739-D, 2010 WL 184313, at *1
(N.D. Tex. Jan. 14, 2010).
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comparative analysis.”18 “General tests and analyses show that an
article directly complies with all airworthiness regulations appli-
cable to the product affected by article installation.”19 “Compar-
ative tests and analyses substantiate that the PMA article is at
least equal to the original article approved under a type certifi-
cate.”20 Comparative testing generally requires “data from back-
to-back comparisons of testing of [the PMA] article with an arti-
cle from a type certificate.”21
Alternatively, an applicant may rely on the second part of Sec-
tion 21.303(a)(4) to demonstrate that the “design of the article
is identical to the design of [an] article that is covered under a
type certificate.”22 This so-called “identicality” test
does not require that the specifications for a replacement part be
exactly the same as those for the original part. Rather, identical-
ity requires only [ ] that the FAA has determined from a compar-
ison of the two sets of data and drawings, and any other data it
finds relevant, that the PMA part will be an adequate replace-
ment for the original part as to fit, form, and function.23
To establish identicality, an applicant may submit, as part of its
application, “the original design drawing and related produc-
tion specifications referenced within that drawing.”24
If the applicant does not possess the original design drawing
for the OEM part, however, it can reverse engineer it. This pro-
cess “entails disassembly, measurement of features, and material
and functional analyses of an original article.”25 The FAA has
cautioned that “special care” must be taken “in evaluating iden-
ticality based on reverse engineering” because “reverse engi-
neering will not normally produce an identical design” and
“[t]he applicant is unlikely to show that tolerances, processes,
and manufacturing specifications are identical.”26 Thus, in eval-
uating a PMA application, “sound engineering review and com-
18 Application for Parts Manufacturer Approval Via Tests and Computations or
Identicality, FAA Advisory Circular No. 21.303-4, § 7(d) (Mar. 21, 2014).
19 Id. § 25(a).
20 Id. § 25(b).
21 Id.
22 14 C.F.R. § 21.303(a)(4) (2016).
23 United Techs. Corp. v. F.A.A., 102 F.3d 688, 689 (2d Cir. 1996).
24 Parts Manufacturer Approval Procedures, FAA Order No. 8110.42D, § 2-7
(Mar. 21, 2014).
25 Id. § 2-8(c).
26 Id. § 2-7(a).
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pliance determinations” must be submitted to demonstrate
identicality.27
If these standards are satisfied, the FAA will issue a PMA al-
lowing manufacture and sale of parts in accordance with the ap-
proved design.28 Subsequent design changes require FAA
authorization prior to implementation.29
III. ASSEMBLER LIABILITY
In the majority of jurisdictions in the United States, strict
product liability for design defects is based on Section 402A of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts:
One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject
to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user
or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a prod-
uct, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer
without substantial change in the condition in which it is
sold.30
A minority of jurisdictions has adopted Section 1 of the Restate-
ment (Third) of Torts: Products Liability. Pertinent here, it simi-
larly states: “One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise
distributing products who sells or distributes a defective product
is subject to liability for harm to persons or property caused by
the defect.”31
27 Id. § 2-7.
28 See 14 C.F.R. § 21.311 (2016).
29 See id. § 21.319 (setting forth FAA approval requirements for minor and ma-
jor design changes to a PMA article).
30 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1965); Aubin v.
Union Carbide Corp., 177 So. 3d 489, 505–07 (Fla. 2015) (discussing whether to
follow the majority of states in continuing to follow the Restatement (Second) or
to join a minority of states following the Restatement (Third)).
31 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1998).
Pursuant to the Third Restatement, a person is “engaged in the business of sell-
ing” a product when “in a commercial context, one transfers ownership thereto
either for use or consumption or for resale leading to ultimate use or consump-
tion. Commercial product sellers include, but are not limited to, manufacturers,
wholesalers, and retailers.” Id. § 20(a). A person is “otherwise distributing prod-
ucts” when “in a commercial transaction other than a sale, one provides the prod-
uct to another either for use or consumption or as a preliminary step leading to
ultimate use or consumption. Commercial nonsale product distributors include,
but are not limited to, lessors, bailors, and those who provide products to others
as a means of promoting either the use or consumption of such products or some
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The plain text of both versions of the Restatement militates
against imposing strict liability on a product manufacturer that
did not sell a component part later incorporated into the fin-
ished product. This circumstance falls outside the scope of the
plain text because the manufacturer is not the “sell[er]” or “dis-
tribut[or]” of the defective component.32 Accordingly, courts
generally have been reluctant to hold assemblers strictly liable
for defective aftermarket component parts when the assembler
is not in the chain of distribution of those parts.33 Thus, most
have adopted a bright-line rule, categorically refusing to impose
strict liability on entities for component parts they did not sell.
A. THE BRIGHT-LINE RULE
The majority, bright-line approach rejects the application of
strict liability to the original manufacturer for defective
aftermarket parts that the manufacturer did not sell, even if the
parts are identical to the original components that the manufac-
turer incorporated into the original finished product that it did
sell.34 For example, in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Pacific Resources, Inc.,
a ship broke free of its mooring and ran aground after a “chafe
chain” used to hold the ship in place fractured.35 The ship’s
owner, Exxon Shipping, sued the owner and operator of the
mooring facility, a joint venture between four companies re-
ferred to as “HIRI.” In turn, HIRI sued the chain’s designer,
Sofec, seeking to hold it strictly liable for an alleged design de-
fect.36 Sofec argued that it could not be held strictly liable be-
cause, despite the fact that it had provided an identical chain
made by the same supplier (Bridon) to HIRI when the facility
was originally designed and built, it did not sell the specific
chain that failed. Rather, HIRI subsequently had purchased the
other commercial activity.” Id. § 20(b). Though not relevant for the purposes of
this article, the principal difference between these versions of the Restatement
with respect to strict liability is that the Restatement (Third) carves out specific
rules for design-defect and failure-to-warn claims, whereas the Restatement (Sec-
ond) addresses them under the same rubric as manufacturing-defect claims and
subjects all of them to the same test for strict liability. The Restatement (Third)
recognizes distinctions between these three theories of strict liability, addressing
the unique policy rationales for each. See, e.g., id. § 2 cmt. a.
32 See id. § 1; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1).
33 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Pac. Res., Inc., 789 F. Supp. 1521, 1528 (D. Haw.
1991).
34 Id.
35 Id. at 1522.
36 Id. at 1523.
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chain that failed directly from Bridon as a spare part. Sofec,
therefore, was outside the chain of distribution.37 Exxon and
HIRI nonetheless argued that Sofec should be held strictly liable
for the defect in the replacement chain sold by Bridon because
the chain “was identical, in terms of make and manufacture, to
the original component that was incorporated” into the design
of the mooring facility.38
The court refused to hold Sofec strictly liable for a chain it
did not sell because doing so would not further the policies un-
derlying the doctrine of strict liability.39 As the court explained:
Courts have articulated several justifications for holding suppli-
ers, assemblers/manufacturers, and retailers strictly liable for de-
fective component parts. As the Ninth Circuit explained in Pan-
Alaska,40 any integral part of the overall producing and market-
ing enterprise . . . should bear the cost of injuries resulting from
. . . the product’s use. Second, some courts have reasoned that
the assembler, among others, has a position in the marketing
chain that allows it to exert pressure on the manufacturer of the
component part to enhance the safety of the manufacturer’s
product. . . . A third justification for imposing liability is that the
public has a right to expect that a reputable seller will stand be-
hind its goods, and the burden of accidental injuries is properly
placed upon those who market the defective component.
For each of these theories, a position in the chain of title is a
critical link for the imposition of liability. Because there is no
evidence that Sofec ever held title to the fractured chain, Sofec
cannot be held liable under strict liability. First, Sofec did not
benefit financially or otherwise from HIRI’s direct purchase of
the replacement chain from Bridon. . . . To require Sofec to ab-
sorb the social cost of a component part that it did not supply
would undermine that economic result endorsed by the Ninth
Circuit in Pan-Alaska.
Second, assuming that Sofec did not supply the fractured
chain, there is no reason for Sofec to pressure Bridon for safer
components other than the fact that Sofec is held liable. If the
court were to endorse this reasoning, the court would be justified
in imposing liability upon any company that does business with
Bridon. . . . While [strict liability in tort] is meant to require man-
ufacturers and sellers to bear much of the responsibility and cost
of injures to consumers resulting from their defective products, it
37 Id. at 1525–29.
38 Id. at 1526.
39 Id. at 1526–27.
40 Pan-Alaska Fisheries v. Marine Constr. & Design, 565 F.2d 1129, 1135 (9th
Cir. 1977).
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is not meant to impose upon each manufacturer and seller an
absolute liability as insurer for all injuries to consumers, regard-
less of the relation of plaintiff’s injuries to the particular defen-
dant’s product. Although the doctrine of strict liability departs
from general principles of fault, the doctrine, if it is to have any
limits, must be bounded by general principles of responsibility.
Third, it appears that Sofec never represented itself to be the
supplier of the HIRI chain. To the contrary, HIRI purchased the
replacement chain directly from Bridon, intentionally bypassing
Sofec in the chain of supply. Even if Sofec had implicitly en-
dorsed Bridon as an appropriate supplier, the need to preserve a
bright line in the law of strict products liability (that is, a chain of
title rule) is evident.41
The court went on to express particular concern over the last
point of its analysis—namely, the complications that could result
from extending liability to the original manufacturer under a
theory of implicit endorsement—refusing to conduct a mini-
trial on the issue:
[I]f an assembler were strictly liable for an “identical” replace-
ment part purchased from a third party, the court would be
forced to conduct an inquiry into whether the original and the
replacement parts were manufactured by the same company. If
so, whether the original and the replacement parts were suffi-
ciently similar? If so, whether the original and replacement parts
were manufactured utilizing a similar process and similar materi-
als? If so, at what point [in] time did the endorsement by the
assembler of the component manufacturer come to an end, if
ever? Each of these questions would have to be answered in or-
der to support liability under an “endorsement” theory, notwith-
standing the other justifications for strict liability.42
Most other courts who have examined the issue have agreed.43
However, a minority of courts, principally in California, Mary-
41 Exxon Shipping, 789 F. Supp. at 1527 (some internal citations and quotation
marks omitted).
42 Id. at 1527–28 (internal citations omitted).
43 See, e.g., Baughman v. Gen. Motors Corp., 780 F.2d 1131, 1132–33 (4th Cir.
1986) (no strict liability for spare component parts sold by a third party because
the original “manufacturer has not had an opportunity to test, evaluate, and in-
spect the component; it has derived no benefit from its sale; and it has not repre-
sented to the public that the component part is its own”); Newman v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 524 So. 2d 207, 209 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (“A manufacturer can not
be liable in a product liability claim where it shows that it did not manufacturer
or install the component of the product alleged to be defective.”); Ford Motor
Co. v. Wood, 703 A.2d 1315, 1331 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998) (collecting cases
applying the majority view and noting these courts’ holdings that the policy ratio-
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land, and New York, have begun to abandon the bright-line
approach.
B. ABANDONING THE BRIGHT-LINE RULE
In asbestos litigation, a trend away from the bright-line rule
may be emerging with recent high court cases in California, Ma-
ryland, and New York holding that an original manufacturer
may be held strictly liable for defective aftermarket replacement
components, where such components were necessary for the
proper functioning of the product into which they were
incorporated.44
The California Supreme Court first considered this exception
in O’Neil v. Crane Co., a wrongful death action arising from the
use of asbestos-containing gaskets and insulation on World War
II naval warships.45 A naval officer died from mesothelioma
years after serving on an affected aircraft carrier.46 His family
sued two manufacturers of asbestos-containing valves and
pumps—Crane Co. and Warren Pumps LLC—for negligence,
negligent failure to warn, strict liability for failure to warn, and
strict liability for design defect.47 However, the asbestos-contain-
nale for strict liability is “not advanced by making a manufacturer liable for com-
ponent parts that it did not market or place into the stream of commerce”),
abrogated on other grounds by John Crane, Inc. v. Scribner, 800 A.2d 727 (Md.
2002); cf. May v. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., 129 A.3d 984, 1000 (Md. 2015) (distin-
guishing Wood and recognizing that “a manufacturer is generally not strictly liable
for products it has not manufactured or placed into the stream of commerce,”
but also recognizing “narrow circumstances” where strict liability is proper be-
cause “the ultimate product sold . . . cannot function properly without the ex-
pendable and noxious component”).
44 See, e.g., Kochera v. Foster Wheeler, LLC, No. 14-CV-29-SMY-SCW, 2015 WL
5584749, at *4 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 23, 2015) (denying summary judgment for a manu-
facturer whose turbines required insulation that contained asbestos because the
court was “not convinced that a manufacturer should avoid liability on a failure
to warn theory where it designed its products to be used with asbestos-containing
materials”); Spychalla v. Boeing Aerospace Operations, Inc., No. 11–CV–497,
2015 WL 3504927, at *6 (E.D. Wis. June 3, 2015) (denying summary judgment to
defendant manufacturer in a strict liability claim because the manufacturer speci-
fied the use of an asbestos part in its service manuals); Quirin v. Lorillard To-
bacco Co., 17 F. Supp. 3d 760, 769–70 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (holding that “a duty may
attach where the defendant manufactured a product that, by necessity, contained
asbestos components, where the asbestos-containing material was essential to the
proper functioning of the defendant’s product, and where the asbestos-contain-
ing material would necessarily be replaced by other asbestos-containing material,
whether supplied by the original manufacturer or someone else”).
45 O’Neil v. Crane Co., 266 P.3d 987, 991 (Cal. 2012).
46 Id. at 993.
47 Id. at 991.
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ing components the naval officer encountered were not manu-
factured and sold by the defendants, but by third parties on the
aftermarket.48 The plaintiff argued that the defendants should
be held strictly liable as well as negligent because the original
valves and pumps were designed to be used with asbestos-con-
taining components.49 According to the plaintiffs, “it was fore-
seeable workers would be exposed to and harmed by the
asbestos in replacement parts” used with the original manufac-
turers’ valves and pumps.50
The plaintiffs prevailed on this theory in the California Court
of Appeal. According to the Court of Appeal, “these replace-
ment parts were ‘no different’ from the asbestos-containing
components originally included in defendants’ products. . . . ‘If
[the defendants] had warned the hypothetical original user, or
protected that person by avoiding defective design, subsequent
users, too, would have been protected.’”51
The California Supreme Court reversed, reaffirming the long-
standing and fundamental principle that “strict products liability
should be imposed only on those entities responsible for placing
a defective product into the stream of commerce.”52 The Court
noted that strict liability had never been extended to “harm
from entirely distinct products that the consumer can be ex-
pected to use with, or in, the defendant’s nondefective prod-
uct,” and it emphasized that “the basis for [strict] liability
remains that [the manufacturer] has marketed or distributed a
defective product.”53 On the record before it, the Court there-
fore concluded:
[I]t is undisputed that O’Neil was exposed to no asbestos from a
product made by defendants. Although he was exposed to poten-
tially high levels of asbestos dust released from insulation the
Navy had applied to the exterior of the pumps and valves, [the
defendants] did not manufacture or sell this external insulation.
They did not mandate or advise that it be used with their prod-
ucts. O’Neil was also exposed to asbestos from the replacement
gaskets and packing inside the pumps and valves. Yet, uncontro-
verted evidence established that these internal components were
not the original parts supplied by [the defendants]. They were
48 Id.
49 Id. at 996.
50 Id. at 991.
51 Id. at 994.
52 Id. at 995.
53 Id.
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replacement parts the Navy had purchased from other
sources. . . . Although the internal gaskets and packing originally
supplied with defendants’ products contained asbestos, none of
these original parts remained on board the [ship] by the time
O’Neil arrived decades later. Accordingly, even assuming the in-
clusion of asbestos makes a product defective, no defect inherent
in defendants’ pump and valve products caused O’Neil’s
disease.54
This holding of O’Neil is thus consistent with the bright-line
rule applied in most other jurisdictions. However, the California
Supreme Court went on to note other scenarios that might war-
rant a deviation from the bright-line approach:
A stronger argument for liability might be made in the case of a
product that required the use of a defective part in order to oper-
ate. In such a case, the finished product would inevitably incor-
porate a defect. One could argue that replacement of the
original defective part with an identically defective one supplied
by another manufacturer would not break the chain of causation.
Similarly, if the product manufacturer specified or required the
use of a defective replacement part, a stronger case could be
made that the manufacturer’s failure to warn was a proximate
cause of resulting injury. In both contexts, however, the policy
rationales against imposing liability on a manufacturer for a de-
fective part it did not produce or supply would remain. These
difficult questions are not presented in the case before us, and
we express no opinion on their appropriate resolution.55
Even though this footnote correctly has been construed as
“merely dicta [that] does not reflect California law,”56 some sub-
sequent California lower court decisions have cited it to justify
denying the dismissal of a complaint alleging strict liability on
the grounds that a manufacturer designed its product to be
used with a potentially defective product sold by another party.57
54 Id. at 996.
55 Id. at 996 n.6 (citation omitted).
56 McNaughton v. Gen. Elec. Co., No. 2:11-63943-ER, 2012 WL 5395008, at *1
n.1 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 9, 2012); see also Floyd v. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., No. 2:10-CV-
69379-ER, 2012 WL 975684, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 9, 2012) (“The Court has
considered Plaintiffs’ argument . . . that Defendant is liable for asbestos-contain-
ing component parts that were used with its pumps but that it did not manufac-
ture or supply because its pumps required (or ‘called for’) the use of defective
(i.e., asbestos-containing) component parts in order to operate. However, the
Court rejects this argument because California law does not provide for such
liability, and notes that footnote 6 of O’Neil is dictum.”).
57 See, e.g., Hetzel v. Hennessy Indus., Inc., 202 Cal. Rptr. 3d 310, 317 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2016) (defendant manufacturer could be held liable for replacement brake
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Few of these cases, however, also have cited the California Su-
preme Court’s additional word of caution that, even if “required
use” might justify imposing strict liability on a manufacturer
outside the stream of commerce, “the policy rationales against
imposing liability on a manufacturer for a defective part it did
not produce or supply would remain.”58
Notwithstanding this observation, a recent decision from Ma-
ryland’s highest court, under facts similar to Crane, applied strict
liability to a company that did not manufacture or place the
component part at issue into the stream of commerce.59 In May
v. Air & Liquid Systems Corp., a majority of the court held that,
even if a manufacturer does not actually produce or sell the spe-
cific asbestos-containing component at issue, it nonetheless
will have a duty to warn under negligence and strict liability when
(1) its product contains asbestos components, and no safer mate-
rial is available; (2) asbestos is a critical part of the pump sold by
the manufacturer; (3) periodic maintenance involving handling
asbestos gaskets and packing is required; and (4) the manufac-
turer knows or should know the risks from exposure to
asbestos.60
linings that contained asbestos when “virtually all brake linings during the rele-
vant time period contained asbestos which resulted in [the defendant’s] ma-
chines being used 90 to 95 percent of the time to grind brakes producing
asbestos dust,” and therefore the “‘normal operation’ of the grinders inevitably
caused the release of asbestos dust”); Olivares v. Morehouse-Cowles, No.
B245407, 2014 WL 1571766, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 21, 2014) (cause of action
for strict liability adequately pled where “the complaint alleges defendants’ prod-
uct was specifically ‘intended to be used with another product’ (chemical ingredi-
ents used to manufacture electrical insulation) ‘for the very activity that created a
hazardous situation’ (mixing the chemical ingredients together, causing the re-
lease of toxic particles)”); Shields v. Hennessy Indus., Inc., 140 Cal. Rptr. 3d 268,
281 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (“Taken as true, the causes of action contend that Hen-
nessy distributed a machine directly to consumers designed only to grind asbes-
tos-containing brake linings, a machine that was defective because its intended
operation necessarily released asbestos fibers into the air and was not a machine
manufactured for use as a component in another finished product. . . . [T]he
alleged sole and intended use of the brake arcing machine resulted in the release
of contained asbestos particles. These allegations satisfy the circumscribed pa-
rameters of liability articulated by the Court of Appeal in Tellez-Cordova and ap-
proved by the Supreme Court in O’Neil.”).
58 See O’Neil, 266 P.3d at 996 n.6. In addition, the Washington State Supreme
Court has rejected the California courts’ expanded view of strict liability on pol-
icy grounds. Simonetta v. Viad Corp., 197 P.3d 127, 135 (Wash. 2008).
59 May v. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., 129 A.3d 984, 1000 (Md. 2015).
60 Id.
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The majority acknowledged the refusal by other courts (includ-
ing the California Supreme Court in Crane) to hold original
manufacturers liable for replacement asbestos components, but
it ultimately opined that the particular facts of this case
presented one of the “narrow circumstances” in which a manu-
facturer could be held strictly liable because “the pump con-
tained asbestos, and . . . the asbestos was essential to its
operation, needed periodic replacement, and was dangerous.”61
The dissent, however, emphasized that the majority’s holding
“impermissibly expand[ed] strict liability in all products liability
cases––not just those involving asbestos products––and
blur[red] beyond recognition the existing bright line that, to be
strictly liable, the defendant must have either manufactured or
sold the injury-causing product.”62
Consistent with the majority view in May, the New York Court
of Appeals also recently held in In re New York City Asbestos Litiga-
tion that “the manufacturer of a product has a duty to warn of
the danger arising from the known and reasonably foreseeable
use of its product in combination with a third-party product
which, as a matter of design, mechanics or economic necessity,
is necessary to enable the manufacturer’s product to function as
intended.”63 The Court of Appeals relied in part on its view that
the original product manufacturer is in a superior position, as
compared to the third-party component manufacturer, to know
of and warn against the hazards of using the product with an-
other company’s component part.64 As the court explained:
[W]here one manufacturer’s product is a durable item designed
for continuous use with the other manufacturer’s fungible prod-
uct, which by contrast deteriorates relatively quickly and is de-
signed to be replaced, the manufacturer of the durable product
typically is in the best position to guarantee that those who use
the two products together will receive a warning; the end user is
more likely to interact with the durable product over an ex-
tended period of time, and hence he or she is more likely to
61 Id.
62 Id. at 1004–05 (Watts, J., dissenting).
63 In re N.Y.C. Asbestos Litig., 59 N.E.3d 458, 463 (N.Y. 2016). In the process,
the court blurred the line between strict liability and negligence almost com-
pletely. See id. at 469 (“While claims based on . . . a lack of adequate warnings[ ]
can be framed in terms of strict liability or negligence, failure-to-warn claims
grounded in strict liability and negligence are functionally equivalent, as both
forms of a failure-to-warn claim depend on the principles of reasonableness and
public policy at the heart of any traditional negligence action.”).
64 Id. at 471–72.
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inspect warnings on that item or in associated documentation
than to review warnings supplied by the maker of the “wear
item.”65
The Court of Appeals also addressed the policy argument un-
derlying strict liability, that the original product seller gains no
economic advantage from the sale of the necessary component
replacement part, as follows:
[W]here a manufacturer creates a product that cannot be used
without another product as a result of the design of the product,
the mechanics of the product or the absence of economically fea-
sible alternative means of enabling the product to function as
intended, the manufacturer has a substantial, albeit indirect, role
in placing the third-party product in the stream of commerce.
Specifically, when the manufacturer produces a product that re-
quires another product to function, the manufacturer naturally
opens up a profitable market for that essential component,
thereby encouraging the other company to make that related
product and place it in the stream of commerce. The manufac-
turer also derives a benefit from the sale of the essential third-
party product, as the manufacturer is able to sell its own product
to customers precisely because the third party has sold to those
customers another item that is essential to the product’s
function.66
Echoing May’s dissent, a concurring opinion in In re New York
City Asbestos Litigation expressed concern that the majority’s
“functional necessity” test “opens too broad an avenue of poten-
tial liability,” and stated that to properly follow precedent, a
standard “must focus on the affirmative action taken by the
manufacturer in placing the harmful product containing asbes-
tos into the stream of commerce.”67
What remains to be seen is whether this emerging departure
from the “bright-line rule” of strict liability specifically in the as-
bestos context foreshadows a similar departure more broadly in
other product liability cases, as feared by the dissenting and con-
curring opinions in May and In re New York City Asbestos
Litigation.
65 Id. at 472.
66 Id. at 474 (internal citation omitted).
67 Id. at 483.
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IV. OTHER HEAVILY REGULATED INDUSTRIES
In many industries, such as those at issue in the cases de-
scribed above, the government does not regulate a manufac-
turer’s design, manufacture, and sale of products or component
parts. But the aviation industry is heavily regulated by the FAA
under the Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) which, among
other things, set out a particular procedure, discussed above,
that must be followed before a party may lawfully manufacture
and sell certain aviation products or replacement parts.68 As
foreshadowed by O’Neil, should it make a difference that the ap-
plicable regulations require the replacement parts to be substan-
tially identical to their original counterparts? To answer that
question, it is instructive to examine other heavily regulated
products, such as pharmaceuticals.
In the pharmaceutical industry, manufacturers must apply to
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for approval to mar-
ket a new drug.69 The drug’s manufacturer must prove to the
FDA that there is enough evidence on the drug’s safety and ef-
fectiveness to meet the FDA’s requirements for marketing ap-
proval.70 A new drug application (NDA) must contain, inter alia,
a summary of the pharmacologic class of the drug, its scientific
rationale, its intended use, and its potential clinical benefits.71 It
must also contain technical sections with “data and information
in sufficient detail to permit the agency to make a knowledgea-
ble judgment about whether to approve the [application].”72
Among other things, these technical sections must include (1) a
description of the “composition, manufacture, and specification
of the drug substance . . . including its physical and chemical
characteristics and stability”; (2) the method of its synthesis; “the
specifications necessary to ensure the identity, strength, quality,
and purity of the drug substance”; and (3) preclinical (animal)
and clinical (human) testing data establishing safety and effec-
tiveness.73 “The process of submitting an NDA,” therefore, is
“both onerous and lengthy.”74
However, manufacturers of generic versions of innovator (or
name-brand) drugs that the FDA already has approved can cir-
68 See supra Part II.
69 See generally 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.1–314.170 (2016).
70 Id. § 314.105(c).
71 Id. § 314.50(c)(2).
72 Id. § 314.50(d).
73 Id.
74 Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2471 (2013).
2017] DISASSEMBLING ASSEMBLER LIABILITY 185
cumvent the onerous and lengthy NDA process by submitting an
abbreviated new drug application (ANDA).75 Under this
process:
[A] generic drug may be approved without the same level of
clinical testing required for approval of a new brand-name drug,
provided the generic drug is identical to the already-approved
brand-name drug in several key respects. First, the proposed ge-
neric drug must be chemically equivalent to the approved brand-
name drug: it must have the same “active ingredient” or “active
ingredients,” “route of administration,” “dosage form,” and
“strength” as its brand-name counterpart. Second, a proposed ge-
neric must be “bioequivalent” to an approved brand-name drug.
That is, it must have the same “rate and extent of absorption” as
the brand-name drug. Third, the generic drug manufacturer
must show that “the labeling proposed for the new drug is the
same as the labeling approved for the [approved brand-name]
drug.” Once a drug—whether generic or brand-name—is ap-
proved, the manufacturer is prohibited from making any major
changes to the “qualitative or quantitative formulation of the
drug product, including active ingredients, or in the specifica-
tions provided in the approved application.” Generic manufac-
turers are also prohibited from making any unilateral changes to
a drug’s label.76
An ANDA generally does not need to provide the results of
clinical studies to establish safety and effectiveness; rather, the
applicant must prove that the generic drug is “bioequivalent” to
the innovator drug—that is, that it performs in the same man-
ner.77 The abbreviated new drug application requires the appli-
cant to show bioequivalence by one of two methods. The
applicant can provide “[e]vidence demonstrating that the drug
product . . . is bioequivalent to the reference listed drug,” such
as a report of the results of bioequivalence studies.78 Alterna-
tively, the applicant can provide “[i]nformation to show that the
drug product is bioequivalent to the reference-listed drug which
would permit FDA to waive the submission of evidence demon-
strating in vivo bioequivalence.”79 Bioequivalence may be “self-
evident” if, for example, the generic is administered in a particu-
lar way and “[c]ontains an active drug ingredient in the same
concentration and dosage form as a drug product that is the
75 See 21 C.F.R. § 314.92(a).
76 Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2471 (citations omitted).
77 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(7) (2016).
78 Id. § 320.21(b)(1).
79 Id. § 320.21(b)(2).
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subject of an approved full new drug application or abbreviated
new drug application” and “[c]ontains no inactive ingredient or
other change in formulation from the [approved drug] that
may significantly affect” the functioning of the generic.80 Gener-
ally, the generic drug’s “[l]abeling (including the container la-
bel, package insert, and, if applicable, Medication Guide)
proposed for the drug product must be the same as the labeling
approved for the reference listed drug.”81
Plaintiffs who have taken generic drugs have sued the innova-
tor drug manufacturers, arguing that the manufacturers of
name-brand drugs should be subject to strict liability for the de-
fects of the generic versions. In nearly all of these cases, the
courts have held that a name-brand drug manufacturer cannot
be held liable under a strict liability theory where the plaintiff
took the generic equivalent.82 “[E]very federal circuit court to
consider the issue . . . has reached a similar conclusion, applying
the law of several states.”83 In at least twenty-two states, “it is well-
settled law that the ‘threshold requirement of any products-lia-
bility claim is that the plaintiff assert that the defendant’s prod-
uct caused the plaintiff’s injury.’”84 Thus, even in the heavily
regulated drug context, where generic drug manufacturers are
required to strictly adhere to the design of the innovator drug,
courts have followed the “bedrock principles of tort law,” immu-
nizing from strict liability manufacturers who “do not have any
relationship” with the plaintiff who ingested the generic drug,
thus refusing to “make brand manufacturers the de facto insur-
ers for competing generic manufacturers.”85
Only one state court has deviated from this bright-line rule,
and its legislature swiftly overruled it. In Wyeth, Inc. v. Weeks, the
Alabama Supreme Court became the first state supreme court to
recognize strict liability for brand-name manufacturers in a fail-
ure-to-warn case brought by a patient who claimed he was in-
80 Id. § 320.22(b)(3)(ii)–(iii).
81 Id. § 314.94(a)(8)(iv).
82 See, e.g., Lashley v. Pfizer, Inc., 750 F.3d 470, 476–77 (5th Cir. 2014)
(“[C]laims against brand manufacturers are foreclosed by [the plaintiffs’] respec-
tive states’ product liability laws . . . which shield the companies from liability for
products they did not create” because such manufacturers “are not ‘manufactur-
ers or sellers’” of the product at issue.).
83 McNair v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 2:14-17463, 2015 WL 3935787, at *5
(S.D. W. Va. June 26, 2015) (collecting cases).
84 In re Darvocet, Darvon, & Propoxyphene Prods. Liab. Litig., 756 F.3d 917,
938 & n.7 (6th Cir. 2014) (collecting cases).
85 Huck v. Wyeth, Inc., 850 N.W.2d 353, 379–80 (Iowa 2014).
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jured after taking the generic version of a brand-name drug.86
Plaintiffs argued that the name-brand manufacturer’s duty to
warn of its drug’s side effects—and to refrain from making re-
lated fraudulent misrepresentations—extended to the generic
version manufactured and sold by a third party.87 The court
agreed, recognizing that the claims were, “in essence, ‘products-
liability’ claims.”88 It emphasized that prescription drugs, “un-
like other consumer products, are highly regulated by the FDA,”
and that because of the labeling duties imposed by law on name-
brand and generic drug manufacturers, “it is not fundamentally
unfair to hold the brand-name manufacturer liable for warnings
on a product it did not produce” because a name-brand manu-
facturer could foresee harm to a patient taking the generic
caused by inadequate labeling.89
However, the Alabama state legislature abrogated the holding
by enacting a statute restricting liability for product liability
claims, including design defect claims, to the actual manufac-
turer of the article that injured the plaintiff. “Designers, manu-
facturers, sellers, or lessors of products not identified as having
been used, ingested, or encountered by an allegedly injured
party may not be held liable for any alleged injury . . . even if [a
third party’s] use of the [original manufacturer’s] design is
foreseeable.”90
As these precedents make abundantly clear, courts—and leg-
islatures—have overwhelmingly applied the traditional, bright-
86 See Wyeth, Inc. v. Weeks, 159 So. 3d 649, 676 (Ala. 2014).
87 Id. at 655.
88 Id. at 656.
89 Id. at 676–77. The court identified two other decisions recognizing the possi-
bility of brand-name manufacturer liability. However, neither case involved strict
liability. See Kellogg v. Wyeth, 762 F. Supp. 2d 694, 703–09 (D. Vt. 2010) (apply-
ing Vermont law and denying summary judgment on negligence and fraud
claims against a brand-name manufacturer); Conte v. Wyeth, Inc., 85 Cal. Rptr.
3d 299, 311, 318 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (applying California law, denying summary
judgment on intentional and negligent misrepresentation claims against a brand-
name manufacturer, and specifically noting that strict liability could not be ap-
plied because the plaintiff did not take the brand-name drug). Another court
similarly denied summary judgment in favor of a brand-name manufacturer sued
in negligence by a patient who took a generic equivalent, but also refused to hold
the brand-name manufacturer strictly liable for defects in the generic version of
the drug because “the public policy rationale that justifies burdening the seller
with the cost of injury rather than the consumer does not merit placing liability
on an entity [the brand-name manufacturer] whose benefit from the sale is so
remote, and whose ability to account for the cost is so limited.” Dolin v.
SmithKline Beecham Corp., 62 F. Supp. 3d 705, 720–24 (N.D. Ill. 2014).
90 ALA. CODE § 6-5-530(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2016).
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line refusal to apply strict liability to manufacturers who are not
in the chain of distribution of an allegedly defective product,
even in industries as heavily regulated as aviation.
V. A BRIGHT-LINE RULE FOR AVIATION
Returning to the gadget hypothesized at the outset, imagine
that the defective component was a PMA replacement part, not
the same gadget that was on the aircraft when the OEM sold it.
Should the OEM, who holds the type certificate for the aircraft,
be held strictly liable for the defective PMA part?
One might argue that the OEM should be held liable for the
defective PMA part because the PMA part was identical to the
original gadget incorporated into the OEM’s type-certificated
aircraft, thus rendering the harm foreseeable to the OEM. This
argument has superficial appeal. As the holder of the type certif-
icate, the OEM is responsible for the airworthiness of the air-
craft, and the type certificate issued includes all the components
on the aircraft and, at least for major components, usually speci-
fies them by manufacturer and part number. The PMA process
is specifically designed to ensure that replacement parts for
these components are equally as airworthy as the OEM’s original
parts by directly comparing them to the components on the
OEM’s type-certificated product. Therefore, the argument goes,
the PMA design can be traced back to the OEM’s design, and
the OEM can and should be held accountable for it.
Such reasoning, however, ignores the critical policy considera-
tions justifying strict liability in the first place. Specifically, three
longstanding tort principles that influence the imposition of
strict liability—(1) allocating the risk of loss to the manufac-
turer; (2) exerting pressure on manufacturers to police the
safety of their products; and (3) managing complexity—do not
justify the expansion of strict liability under these circumstances.
A. POLICY JUSTIFICATIONS
1. Risk Allocation
As noted earlier, courts have justified the imposition of strict
liability on assemblers on the grounds that “any integral part of
the ‘overall producing and marketing enterprise . . . should bear
the cost of injuries resulting from’ . . . the product’s use.”91 Lia-
91 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Pac. Res., Inc., 789 F. Supp. 1521, 1527 (D. Haw.
1991).
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bility properly attaches to the “defendant who, by manufactur-
ing, selling, or marketing a product, is in the best position to
know of the dangerous aspects of the product and to translate
that knowledge into a cost of production against which liability
insurance can be obtained.”92
Nothing in the FARs, type-certification procedures, or PMA
process supports allocating the risk of loss from defective PMA
parts to the OEM. As in other industries, if the OEM does not
sell the replacement part, it does not profit from the sale, and it
is in no position to incorporate into the price of the part the
risks associated with its use, or to obtain applicable liability in-
surance. At best, the OEM can only incorporate such risks into
the cost of producing its own product. Expecting the OEM
nonetheless somehow also to take into account the risk associ-
ated with the use of a spare part that it did not make or sell
would effectively transform the OEM into an insurer of the PMA
manufacturer—a result courts squarely and consistently have
rejected.93
2. Pressure on Manufacturers to Maintain Safety
It could be argued that the OEM, upon whose design the
PMA part is necessarily based, has the ability to “exert pressure”
on the PMA manufacturer to “enhance the safety” of its product
by enhancing the original, underlying design.94 However, the
OEM plays no role in the PMA application process, assisting
neither the FAA nor the applicant. The OEM does not review
the PMA manufacturer’s design for the replacement compo-
nent; it quite obviously plays no part in reverse engineering its
own design; and it conducts no tests on the PMA design to en-
sure its airworthiness. The ultimate decision of whether to grant
the PMA is reposed exclusively with the FAA and is based on
data provided by the PMA applicant alone. Often, the OEM is
not even privy to the fact that a PMA application has been sub-
92 Simonetta v. Viad Corp., 197 P.3d 127, 134 (Wash. 2008).
93 See Exxon Shipping, 789 F. Supp. at 1527 (“While [strict liability in tort] is
meant to require manufacturers and sellers to bear much of the responsibility
and cost of injuries to consumers resulting from their defective products, it is not
meant to impose upon each manufacturer and seller an absolute liability as in-
surer for all injuries to consumers, regardless of the relation of plaintiff’s injuries
to the particular defendant’s product.”) (quoting Southwire Co. v. Beloit E.
Corp., 370 F. Supp. 842, 848 (E.D. Pa. 1974)).
94 See id.
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mitted.95 From the outset, therefore, an OEM has no meaning-
ful influence over the PMA process.96
Nor does an OEM have a significant opportunity to influence
a PMA manufacturer after the FAA grants the PMA. The OEM
plays no role in the manufacturing or quality control processes
employed by the PMA manufacturer. The OEM has no “oppor-
tunity to test, evaluate, and inspect the component”97 as it comes
off the PMA manufacturer’s assembly line. The OEM thus has
no ability to influence the safety of the PMA part at this stage of
the process either.
The same is true later, after the PMA part is being sold on the
market. If the OEM were to determine that the PMA design is
defective, then perhaps the OEM could “exert pressure” on the
PMA supplier indirectly by changing the design of its own type-
certificated product.98 Given that PMA approval is contingent
on proof that the PMA part is functionally equivalent to the
OEM component, it could be argued that a path to “exerting
pressure” on the PMA manufacturer is changing the OEM de-
sign.99 The flaw in this logic, however, is that there may not be
anything wrong with the OEM design that would compel a
change. It is entirely consistent with the FARs for an OEM to
recognize the adequacy of its own design yet disagree with the
FAA’s determination of airworthiness for the PMA part.100
Under such circumstances, a design change to the OEM’s prod-
uct would not be warranted.
One could also argue that the OEM might exert pressure on a
PMA manufacturer by reporting potential safety problems with
the PMA part to the FAA. However, the FARs do not require
OEMs to investigate or report an issue with a PMA part to the
95 See United Techs. Corp. v. F.A.A., 102 F.3d 688, 691 (2d Cir. 1996).
96 See In re Deep Vein Thrombosis, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1067 (N.D. Cal. 2005)
(holding that, as a matter of law, “Boeing was under no duty to ‘exert pressure’
or ‘reward’” third-party airlines and seat manufacturers “to design safer seats and
seating configurations”).
97 Baughman v. Gen. Motors Corp., 780 F.2d 1131, 1133 (4th Cir. 1986).
98 See Exxon Shipping, 789 F. Supp. at 1527.
99 Section 21.319 of the FARs creates a parallel procedure for instituting de-
sign changes to a PMA part that corresponds to the procedure for instituting
design changes to a type-certificated component. See Production and Airworthi-
ness Approvals, Part Marking, and Miscellaneous Proposals, 71 Fed. Reg. 58914
(proposed Oct. 5, 2006) (codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 1, 21, 43, 45) (discussing 14
C.F.R. § 21.319, pertaining to design changes to PMA parts, and “add[ing] re-
quirements for classifying and approving PMA design changes”).
100 See United Techs., 102 F.3d at 689.
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FAA. The FARs require a type certificate holder or a PMA,
under certain enumerated circumstances, to report “any failure,
malfunction, or defect in any product or article manufactured by
it.”101 The law thus places the reporting responsibility on the
party that holds either the type certificate or PMA and manufac-
tured the part—which, in the case of PMA parts, is not the
OEM.102
Practically speaking, the lack of a legal obligation does not
mean that the OEM is not permitted to make such reports. In-
deed, the FARs contemplate that someone other than the OEM
or PMA manufacturer may report defective product issues to the
FAA.103 An OEM thus could report PMA product defects to the
FAA. But regardless of the source of the report, it is ultimately
the FAA’s prerogative to take the action it deems appropriate,
which could include, for example, revocation of the PMA,104 is-
suance of an airworthiness directive,105 or nothing at all. Even
assuming an OEM were somehow aware of issues with a PMA
part, and reported those issues to the FAA, the OEM would still
be unable to exert any direct, meaningful pressure on the PMA
manufacturer with regard to safety. At best, an OEM has the
same ability to exert indirect pressure on the PMA manufacturer
as any other person making a report to the FAA.106 If such indi-
rect and attenuated pressure were enough to warrant strict lia-
101 14 C.F.R. § 21.3(a) (2016) (emphasis added).
102 See Dalrymple v. Fairchild Aircraft Inc., 575 F. Supp. 2d 790, 797 (S.D. Tex.
2008) (“By its plain terms, § 21.3(a) applies only to a type certificate holder that
also manufactured the subject product or part that is determined to be defective.
Although Defendant held the type certificate for the SA 226-AT at the time of the
accident, it is undisputed that Swearingen, not Defendant, manufactured the air-
craft. The reporting requirement in § 21.3(a) does not apply to a non-manufac-
turer such as Defendant.”).
103 See 14 C.F.R. § 21.3(d)(1)(ii) (carving out of Section 21.3’s reporting obli-
gations for “[f]ailures, malfunctions, or defects” that “[w]ere reported to the FAA
by another person”).
104 See 14 C.F.R. § 21.313 (2016).
105 See id. § 39.5 (2016).
106 It could be argued that the OEM could exert pressure on the PMA manu-
facturer by surrendering its type certificate completely. See id. § 21.51 (“A type
certificate is effective until surrendered, suspended, revoked, or a termination
date is otherwise established by the FAA.”). This would be a drastic step that
would have little, if any, effect on PMA manufacturers. Surrender of a type certifi-
cate would cause all production of the type-certificated product to stop, but it
would not necessarily result in a revocation of airworthiness certificates from ex-
isting products already on the market, nor would it prevent PMA holders from
continuing to manufacture parts. See Type Certification, FAA Order No. 8110.4C,
§ 3-2 (Dec. 20, 2011).
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bility against the OEM with respect to PMA parts, it is difficult to
see any limit to the OEM’s potential liability.
In the absence of a right to intervene or appeal from the
FAA’s grant of PMA approval to a third party, an OEM simply
does not have any meaningful influence over a PMA manufac-
turer’s production and sale of spare parts.
3. Managing Complexity
Courts often refuse to extend strict liability based on the need
to avoid injecting unnecessary complication into already com-
plex product liability cases. As the court in Exxon Shipping noted:
[T]he need to preserve a bright line in the law of strict products
liability (that is, a chain of title rule) is evident. For example, if
an assembler were strictly liable for an “identical” replacement
part purchased from a third party, the court would be forced to
conduct an inquiry into whether the original and the replace-
ment parts were manufactured by the same company. . . . If so,
whether the original and the replacement parts were sufficiently
similar? . . . If so, whether the original and replacement parts
were manufactured utilizing a similar process and similar materi-
als? If so, at what point [in] time did the endorsement by the
assembler of the component manufacturer come to an end, if
ever? Each of these questions would have to be answered in or-
der to support liability . . . notwithstanding the other justifica-
tions for strict liability.107
These concerns are especially compelling in the aviation
context.
One could argue that the PMA regulatory approval process
largely alleviates such concerns—after all, the FAA already has
determined identicality or, at least, functional equivalence and
already has approved of the manufacturing and quality control
processes. However, this argument assumes that a court and the
parties are necessarily bound by the FAA’s determinations.
Given the OEM’s absence from the PMA process, and the fact-
intensive nature of these issues, a court is unlikely to impose the
FAA’s determinations on the OEM without at least giving it an
opportunity to rebut them. Indeed, due process would compel it
to do so.108 Consequently, the existence and possible use of the
107 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Pac. Res., Inc., 789 F. Supp. 1521, 1527–28 (D. Haw.
1991).
108 Moreover, although the FAA’s determinations may be presumed admissible
as public records, it is not a given that they would be admitted into evidence, let
alone given conclusive weight. For example, courts have refused to admit both
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FAA’s PMA determinations ultimately would not avoid, and may
even exacerbate, the complicated nature of these already-com-
plex cases.
B. ABANDONING THE BRIGHT-LINE RULE, REVISITED
As discussed above, in some asbestos cases, a minority of juris-
dictions have considered and recently adopted an exception to
the bright-line rule against imposing strict liability on original
manufacturers for products manufactured and sold by a third
party. According to the California Supreme Court, for example,
a “stronger case” for strict liability can be made if the OEM’s
product “required the use of a defective part in order to oper-
ate.”109 In most PMA cases, this exception would seem to have
little effect on the outcome of the case—after all, an OEM usu-
ally does not design its product to require a PMA replacement
part. There is one potential scenario, though, that warrants a
closer look. What if, instead of a PMA gadget, the part at issue
was the same model and part number gadget used on the
OEM’s product, but was simply purchased directly from the
OEM’s supplier? Couldn’t this be one of the “narrow circum-
stances”110 contemplated by May or O’Neil in which strict liability
could apply because the type-certificated product was designed
specifically to operate with that part?
This was the precise fact pattern in the Exxon Shipping case—a
case in which the court rejected the imposition of strict liability
under such circumstances, given the policies underlying assem-
bler liability.111 Cases such as May and In re New York City Asbestos
Litigation rejected, either expressly or implicitly, the holdings in
cases like Crane and Exxon Shipping, but failed to meaningfully
address the policy justifications for the bright-line rule—a flaw
in the majority’s reasoning that the dissenting and concurring
National Transportation Safety Board staff factual reports and FAA airworthiness
directives under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)(C), where circumstances sug-
gest that they are untrustworthy. See generally William D. Janicki, Aircraft Accident
Reports and Other Government Documents: Evidentiary Use in International Air Crash
Litigation in the United States, 74 J. AIR L. & COM. 801 (2009) (examining the evi-
dentiary use of civil and military accident reports and other government docu-
ments in plane accident litigation).
109 O’Neil v. Crane Co., 266 P.3d 987, 996 n.6 (Cal. 2012).
110 May v. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., 129 A.3d 984, 995 (Md. 2015); see also O’Neil,
266 P.3d at 998 n.7.
111 Exxon Shipping, 789 F. Supp. at 1526–27.
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opinions in both cases emphasized.112 While May never reaches
these questions, In re New York City Asbestos Litigation flips the
policy consideration on its head, opining that an original prod-
uct manufacturer “benefit[s] from the sale of the essential third-
party product, as the manufacturer is able to sell its own product
to customers [precisely] because the third party has sold to
those customers another item that is essential to the product’s
function.”113 However, the logic is precisely backwards. The mar-
ket for the component manufacturer’s replacement part is cre-
ated by the sale of the original product, not the other way
around. The asbestos cases give the other most basic principles
of strict liability short shrift, leaving their justification for ex-
panding strict liability—especially outside the asbestos con-
text—wanting. For the reasons discussed above, the policy
rationales underlying strict liability apply with equal force in avi-
ation cases and counsel against expanding the doctrine to parts
not manufactured or sold by the OEM.
VI. NEW TECHNOLOGY, NEW RULE?
An emerging technology known as additive manufacturing
(or 3-D printing) “seems poised to transform the goods we buy,
112 In re N.Y.C. Asbestos Litig., 59 N.E.3d 458, 484 (N.Y. 2016) (“Rather than
basing liability on the defendant’s actions here, the majority, in my view, focuses
on forces acting upon the product downstream from the manufacturer. While
‘design’ does suggest some affirmative step, under the majority’s test liability may
also be premised, in the alternative, on ‘mechanics’—undefined—or, most
troubling, ‘economic necessity.’ What level of necessity is required and when it
may arise, or what ‘mechanics’ means in this context, will assuredly become ques-
tions for future juries in an expanding pool of litigation.”); May, 129 A.3d at 1005
(Watts, J., dissenting) (“Indeed, to adopt Petitioner’s view would lead to numer-
ous questions and analyses that would further complicate an already complex
litigation process, including inquiry as to whether the original and replacement
parts are sufficiently similar, whether they are manufactured in a similar fashion
with similar materials, whether the manufacturer knew of or anticipated the use
of replacement parts, whether the replacement parts were integral to the prod-
uct’s operation, and whether any other types of suitable replacement parts were
available. . . . As a matter of public policy, a defendant who neither manufactures,
sells, nor otherwise places a product into the stream of commerce generally is not
in a ‘position to take precautions and protect against the defect.’ Nor is such a
defendant able to ‘stand behind’ a good that it did not manufacture or sell. In
other words, the justifications supporting imposition of strict liability—or liability
for negligence, for that matter—on a seller or manufacturer of an injury-causing
product in a failure-to-warn case are absent where the defendant is neither the
seller nor the manufacturer of the product.”) (internal citations omitted).
113 In re N.Y.C. Asbestos Litig., 59 N.E.3d at 474.
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the products we use, and the world we inhabit.”114 This technol-
ogy already has been used by, among others, the entertainment
industry to create props and set pieces for movies, and the medi-
cal industry to create medical implants for patient use.115 The
technology even has found its way onto the International Space
Station as a means of manufacturing tools and spare parts on
site.116 The emergence of this revolutionary technology, and its
particular appeal to manufacturers in the aviation industry, begs
the question of whether its use in aviation manufacturing
should change the foregoing analysis.
By way of background, additive manufacturing is “a process of
joining materials to make objects from 3-D model data, usually
layer upon layer.”117 It allows for the “rapid production of three-
dimensional parts directly from computer models.”118 A 3-D
printer follows the computer-model blueprint to thinly layer
materials, such as powders, to create a three-dimensional ob-
ject.119 Due to its versatility, as noted above, 3-D printing is gain-
ing ground in several industries, including health care, firearms,
clothing, consumer electronics, music, food, and aviation.120 In-
deed, for some time, the aviation industry has been using the
technology to print prototype parts, and some manufacturers
now are shifting to “live” commercial production.121 Conse-
114 Nora Freeman Engstrom, 3-D Printing and Product Liability: Identifying the Ob-
stacles, 162 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 35, 36 (2013).
115 Nicole D. Berkowitz, Note, Strict Liability for Individuals? The Impact of 3-D
Printing on Products Liability Law, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1019, 1019 (2015).
116 Id. at 1019–20.
117 Jeffrey T. Leslie, Comment, The Internet and Its Discontents: 3-D Printing, the
Commerce Clause, and a Possible Solution to an Inevitable Problem, 17 SMU SCI. &
TECH. L. REV. 195, 197 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).
118 Id. (quoting Emanuel Sachs et al., Three Dimensional Printing: Rapid Tooling
and Prototypes Directly from CAD Representation, 39 CIRP ANNALS - MANUFACTURING
TECH. 27, 28 (1990)).
119 Id.
120 Anne Lewis, The Legality of 3D Printing: How Technology Is Moving Faster Than
the Law, 17 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 303, 304 (2014).
121 Niclas Rolander, 3-D Printed Plane Parts Help Sweden’s Arcam to Take Off,
BLOOMBERG TECHNOLOGY (Oct. 12, 2015, 2:30 AM), http://www.bloom-
berg.com/news/articles/2015-10-12/3-d-printed-plane-parts-help-sweden-s-ar-
cam-to-take-off [https://perma.cc/E8L6-8FWP]; see also Brett Lyons, Additive
Manufacturing in Aerospace: Examples and Research Outlook, 42 THE BRIDGE 13,
13–19 (2012) (discussing the additive manufacturing technologies being used for
the production of aircraft components); 3D Printing: A Potential Game Changer for
Aerospace and Defense, 7 GAINING ALTITUDE, May 2013, http://www.pwc.com/us/
en/industrial-products/publications/assets/pwc-gaining-altitude-issue-7-3d-print-
ing.pdf [https://perma.cc/8NRB-7Y64] (discussing current and future applica-
tions of 3-D printing).
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quently, OEMs and PMAs alike are having to establish protocols
and carry out tests to prove to the FAA that 3-D printed parts are
airworthy.
Outside the aviation industry, commentators have noted that
3-D printing carries with it the potential to expand strict liability
beyond sophisticated corporate manufacturers. Additive manu-
facturing “empowers ordinary Americans to become countertop
creators—and not merely of jam and lemonade, but of material
that’s complicated, sophisticated, and potentially dangerous.”122
Thus, a potentially broader pool of product sellers may be cre-
ated and subject to strict liability.123 Whether the policy ratio-
nale for strict liability applies in the case of these homegrown
manufacturers or whether existing state product liability law is
equipped to handle strict liability claims arising from small-scale
3-D printing has been debated in the literature. For example,
some have argued that traditional justifications for strict liability
do not apply in the context of home-based 3-D printing because
such small sellers are “on relatively equal footing with buyers in
their ability to bear the risk” of a product defect.124 Others have
argued that existing state laws may have trouble encompassing
small-scale 3-D printing operations because so-called “hobbyist
inventors” may fall outside the type and scope of commercial
activity that traditionally has justified the imposition of strict lia-
bility.125 Although these issues undoubtedly will need to be ad-
dressed as 3-D printing becomes more common, they will not
likely affect the strict liability analysis in the aviation industry.
Despite the potential of additive manufacturing to revolution-
ize the production of aircraft parts, nothing about the use of the
technology itself in the aviation industry weakens the policy jus-
tifications for the bright-line rule discussed above. An OEM
earns no more profit on a PMA part made by a 3-D printer than
it does on one manufactured using traditional methods. Like-
wise, an OEM plays no greater role in the design process and
has no more influence over a 3-D printing manufacturer to im-
prove the safety of the PMA component part.
122 Engstrom, supra note 117, at 41.
123 Berkowitz, supra note 118, at 1039–40.
124 Id. at 1042.
125 Engstrom, supra note 117, at 37–38 (noting that while “someone who starts
as a 3-D hobbyist could become so wrapped up in her product’s creation and
distribution that she could morph into a commercial seller[,] . . . if the hobbyist
forswears advertising, keeps volumes low, and limits her product’s distribution,
this ‘commercial seller’ requirement . . . will limit liability”).
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And the need for a bright-line rule in the context of a 3-D
printed part may be even more compelling. As discussed above,
courts have favored a bright-line rule for purposes of avoiding
mini-trials concerning questions of identicality and the suffi-
ciency of the manufacturing process.126 PMA parts manufac-
tured by 3-D printing present all the same questions
compounded by additional, new questions concerning the scan-
ning and printing process itself. For example, if reverse-engi-
neered from an existing part, was the scanner operating
correctly? Did the printer correctly interpret the data from the
scan to create a sufficiently identical model? Did the printer’s
software code sufficiently render the part consistent with the de-
sign? Such questions would need to be answered in determining
whether the manufacturing process itself was sufficient and/or
whether the finished product was substantially identical to the
OEM’s design.
Moreover, the process of obtaining a type certificate or a PMA
is complex and requires resources and a level of aviation engi-
neering sophistication and expertise not likely to be present in
many smaller 3-D printing operations. The regulatory environ-
ment for aviation components, therefore, makes it unlikely that
homegrown or small-scale 3-D printing manufacturers will un-
dertake the approval process necessary to enter the market in
the first place. Thus, the potential for the expansion of strict
liability to such manufacturers in the aviation industry is limited.
At bottom, the question of strict liability discussed here turns
not on what technology is being used to produce the part in
question, but rather who is using the technology. And for all the
reasons discussed above, only the actual manufacturer or seller
of parts produced through additive manufacturing should be
held strictly liable for any defects in such parts.
VII. CONCLUSION
“Strict liability is a harsh rule and should be applied only in
very limited situations.”127 While policy considerations may sup-
port placing the risk of harm caused by a defective product on
its manufacturer through the imposition of strict liability, those
same considerations counsel against extending such liability to
126 See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Pac. Res., Inc., 789 F. Supp. 1521, 1527–28
(D. Haw. 1991).
127 Carroll-Boone Water Dist. v. M. & P. Equip. Co., 661 S.W.2d 345, 351 (Ark.
1983).
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OEMs for PMA parts that the OEM did not produce or sell. Re-
gardless of the FAA’s regulatory regime, an OEM that does not
profit from the sale of a PMA component part and has no direct
or otherwise meaningful control over the design or manufactur-
ing processes involved in making the part should not be subject
to strict liability for injuries arising from a defect in the part. Put
simply, an OEM of an aviation product should have no greater
risk of strict liability than any other product manufacturer.
